





THE  
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY  
NAVY GRADUATE COMPTROLLERSHIP PROGRAM

THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING  
OF  
NAVAL STAFFS

BY  
Ralph D. Ettinger  
For  
Doctor A. Rex Johnson

May, 1955

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GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

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## PREFACE

This paper deals with the field of military staffs, and places special emphasis on the naval staff concepts. It was undertaken in an effort to help the writer understand more fully the important role of staff machinery in the Navy, and to develop an appreciation of the sound and tested staff organizational devices.

The contents of this paper have been gleaned from as wide a variety of sources as was available. I wish to acknowledge in particular, the stimulus of the writings of the following military officers: Captain S. S. Miller, U. S. Navy; Captain F. A. Dingfelder, U. S. Navy; Lt. Colonel J. D. Hittle, U. S. Marine Corps; and Lt. Colonel F. M. Arthur, U. S. Army. I am greatly indebted to these officers, and feel that this study could hardly have been brought to fruition had it not been for their enlightening writings.

There is a great deal of work to be done in the field of child labor, and the Commission is very anxious to see that the child labor laws are enforced. It is very important to see that the child labor laws are enforced, and the Commission is very anxious to see that the child labor laws are enforced.

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No major armed effort is better than the  
staff that is directing it.

Hittle

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staff that is directing it.

Little

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

The course of instruction in the Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program at The George Washington University, aside from its primary mission, that of developing officers for the comptrollership function, has served to stimulate motivation in many directions in the field of organization and management. One of these directions has led to the feeling of inadequacy regarding knowledge in the field of military staffs, their organization and function.

Perhaps the major impetus behind this feeling was inspired by the area of doubt that surrounds the difficulties involved in attaining coordination between the line and the staff personnel in industry.

Although much has been written by business theorists regarding organizational principles and concepts, as well as techniques, systems, methods and procedures, top management is still searching for the answer which would permit more effective and efficient management of large industrial complexes. The theorists are in general agreement that the line and staff concept, so common in big business, was adopted from the military services, however such modern critics as Lewpawsky, Dale, and Urwick allege that industry has never fully understood the military organization they had adopted for use.

This suggests that big business, the organizational giants, have thus far been experiencing difficulty in evolving a simple, single system that would be easily adaptable to all types of enterprises, and one which would fulfill the managerial problems of directing and controlling large industrial complexes. This is indeed a challenge for all military personnel involved in the field of management. The mechanics and tech-

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niques of the present staff system of the military forces have proved a practical and efficient instrumentality. The writing of this paper was undertaken in an effort to learn more of these available techniques, and to this end has been richly rewarding.

In seeking material for this study, one is struck with the abundance of literature dealing with the command and staff structure of the Army. Conversely, the absence of material from the pens of Naval writers is apparent. There are those who have produced able discussions on the principles of war, certain tactical theories, and many of the abstract features that make up the profession of arms afloat. Rarely, however, does one find in writing a direct reference to the techniques or the evolution of naval staffs.

In attempting to present the command and staff structure of the military service, special emphasis is placed on the naval concepts and principles. In addition, the discussion is oriented to a naval operational staff at about the task force commander level. Space does not allow discussion of administrative staffs, which of course vary somewhat from operational staffs due to the basic functions they perform. The former concerns itself with personnel administration, basic training, and initial conditioning of ships and aircraft. The latter, are more concerned with the overall training for combat and in planning for, and the supervising the execution of combat operations. The basic ideas of staff functioning and organization are, however applicable to any staff.

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The purpose of this book is to provide a general understanding of the  
fundamentals of naval staff work. It is not intended to be a  
comprehensive treatise on the subject, but rather a guide to the  
basic principles and concepts. The book is written for the benefit of  
those who are interested in the subject, whether they are students,  
officers, or civilians. It is hoped that this book will provide a  
clear and concise introduction to the subject of naval staff work.  
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## CHAPTER II

### EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY STAFF

The modern military systems of land and sea forces are the products of no particular age. Rather they are the products of many centuries of military evolution. Military staffs due to their dynamic characteristics are in a constant state of flux, continually endeavoring to keep pace with the changes in the scientific, social, and political fields.

Staff instrumentalities cannot be considered independently from the nature of warfare itself. Until the nineteenth century, military organizations were small compared to modern standards. The concept of compactness was effectively used until the introduction of gunpowder. In that the armies and navies were instruments of the sovereign, they were commanded by professional and mercenary officers who controlled the entire force in battle. Mooney and Reiley wrote: "Campaigns may cover large areas, but on the actual battlefield, the armies were well concentrated."<sup>1</sup> From the French Revolution onward warfare became a national endeavor of concern to the entire population. It wasn't until World War I that the concept of total war emerged. Rear areas and non-combatants, formerly immune to the horrors of war, found themselves involved in the fight for existence. It remained however, for World War II to drive home the significance of total and global warfare. World War II, the greatest struggle ever, brought an estimated total of 93,000,000 into direct conflict.<sup>2</sup> It involved practically total mobilization of the participating nations. To the United States it meant 14,000,000 citizens

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1. James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, Onward Industry (NY Harper Brothers 1931), p.298

2. General George C. Marsall, The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific (NY Simon and Shuster 1945), p.102



EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM

The military system of land and sea forces in the modern of no particular age. Rather they are the products of many centuries of military evolution. Military tactics due to their dynamic character are in a constant state of flux, continually undergoing change with the changes in the scientific, social, and political fields. Still institutionalism cannot be completely independent from the nature of warfare itself. Until the nineteenth century, military organizations were small compared to modern standards. The concept of command was effectively used with the introduction of gunpowder. In that the states and navies were instruments of the sovereign, they were commanded by professional and permanent officers who controlled the entire force in battle. Mowbray and Bailey wrote: "Consequently any cover large areas, but on the actual battlefield, the states were well known treated." From the French Revolution onward warfare became a national endeavor of concern to the entire population. It wasn't until World War I that the concept of total war emerged. Total war and non-combatants, formerly immune to the horrors of war, found themselves involved in the fight for existence. It remained however, for World War II to drive home the significance of total and global warfare. World War II, the greatest struggle ever, brought an estimated total of 20,000,000 into direct conflict. It involved practically total mobilization of participating nations. To the United States it meant 11,000,000 citizens.

1. James D. Mowbray and Alan C. Bailey, Command and Control (New York: Harper Brothers 1931), p. 230.  
2. General George C. Marshall, The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific (NY: Simon and Schuster 1945), p. 102.



into the military services. Within such a frame of reference has the military staffs evolved.

Historical Evolution. It is not considered within the scope of this paper to explore in detail the evolution of military staffs from antiquity. However, it is considered that for background material, something of a summary review would be of value.

The roots of the modern military staff were clearly discernable as early as 1500 B.C., when the Egyptian armies contained a separate logistical agency with distinct titles for the supply officers.<sup>3</sup> Functional specialists were clearly in evidence by 500 B.C. within the Persian armies of Darius. They were; Intelligence, Supply, Administration, and Engineers. The function of operations officer did not emerge until the late sixteenth century. To the seventeenth century, Hittle summarizes as:

Essentially the story of how, through custom and necessity, certain specific duties gradually were assigned to the various officers who were part of the headquarters personnel of the commander.<sup>4</sup>

The general foundations of modern staffs however, stemmed from the innovations of Gustavus Aldolphus between 1621 and 1632. His concept of such special staff assistants within the headquarters was the genesis.

According to Hittle:

From the standpoint of the evolution of the modern staff systems, the historical evidence strongly supports the contention that all European staffs stem from the system of Gustavus..... All changes after Gustavus might well be considered as variations on the basic theme.<sup>5</sup>

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3. Department of The Army, The Senior ROTC Manual, Volume III (First Edition; Washington: The Adjutant General 1948) p.265.

4. J. D. Hittle, LT. COL. USMC, The Military Staff (Harrisburg: The Military Publishing Company 1944) p.9.

5. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

(New York: The Military Publishing Company 1941) p. 1.  
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(First Edition; Washington: The Adjutant General 1948) p. 305.  
 3. Department of the Army, The Adjutant General, Volume 1

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## Historical Evolution.

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Frederick the Great laid the cornerstone of training and education in creating and maintaining an adequate command and staff system. He had little use for large staffs, but realized the need for proper organization and for the necessity of an intellectual foundation to support the staff structure. Through him, Prussia became the first nation to establish a permanent organization to educate and qualify staff officers.<sup>6</sup>

From the Napoleonic era came the notion of the coordination of the staff and true delegation of authority. Under Napoleon, the chief of staff concept emerged; as the coordinator of all staff activities and the expeditor of the decisions of the commander. Delegation of authority and supervisory power became recognized in staff operations. Staff tools and procedures were perfected.<sup>7</sup>

The Prussian General Staff under the guidance of Moltke, perfected the Napoleonic concepts and created centralized command. Under this system were perfection of staff efficiency and the divorcement of the commander from active participation in battle leadership -- rather he became the director of large scale complex combat operations.

The great German General Staff was simply an extension and refinement of the Prussian concepts. Efficiency was the keynote of such staff operations.<sup>8</sup> The French and British General Staffs were, in large, adapted from the Prussian system.

In the United States an adequate staff system was slow to emerge, its history starting on June 16, 1775, at which time Congress took action to provide Washington with a staff. The system was essentially British,

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6. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

7. Ibid., p. 82.

8. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

The first of these was the fact that the staff system was not a new invention but a development of existing conditions. In the early days of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress was a body of men who met in a room and discussed the affairs of the country. There was no staff system then, but the need for a more efficient way of handling the business of the government was felt. The staff system was developed as a means of organizing the work of the government and of providing a more efficient way of handling the business of the government.

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6. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Ibid., pp. 22-23.



and greatly inferior to the continental systems being developed. Washington was later assisted by Von Steuben, a product from the schools and the campaigns of Frederick the Great.

At the outset of the Civil War, the staff system was essentially the same inadequate Revolutionary staff system, and although some satisfactory changes were made, it remained relatively stagnant until after the Spanish-American War. Commencing in 1894, Secretary of War Elihu Root launched a campaign that was to culminate in 1903, when Congress authorized a General Staff System for the United States Army. This first organization provided little more than the establishment of various committees to study the problems involved.<sup>9</sup>

Theodore Roosevelt was less successful in his attempt to reorganize the Navy Department. Since the year 1842, the department had been divided into administrative divisions or bureaus. Each division chief was responsible only to the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian, who rarely possessed sufficient technical knowledge to perform the functions of supervision and coordination well, if at all. As a result, there was waste and constant conflicts of jurisdiction.<sup>10</sup>

To remedy the situation, the officers of the Line had long advocated a permanent Board of Line Officers, which in effect would constitute a Naval General Staff. They envisioned the Board to have broad powers over the bureaus, and as a consultant to the Secretary of the Navy, on all matters pertaining to policy and administration. While this plan had much to commend it, especially on pure military grounds, Congress opposed it, fearing that such a body would reduce the Secretary to a mere figure-

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9. Ibid., pp. 132-135.

10. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise Of American Naval Power, (N.J. Princeton University Press 1939) p.275.

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9. Ibid., pp. 132-133.

10. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, (U.S. Princeton University Press 1939) p. 115.



head, in addition to usurping Congressional use of the Navy to better serve political aims.

Teddy Roosevelt however, with preparation for war utmost in his mind, championed the general staff idea. He forced the issue before Congress in 1904, but failed to receive any action. In 1908 impetus was again given to the concept, due in a large sense, to several grave charges instituted against the Department for the approval and the building of battleships with gross defects, apparent only after they had joined the Fleet. This permitted a second drive for a naval general staff, headed by Admiral Sims and backed by President Roosevelt. The attempt was again unsuccessful, and could have not been otherwise due to the President's unhappy relations with the Congress.<sup>II</sup>

At the outset of World War I the military services were inadequately organized and staffed. General Pershing recognized this and created staffs throughout the AEF organization. This system stemmed from the British and French, and were war proved general staff concepts, although the French system predominated. By the close of the war, and assisted by the passage of the Overman Act in May, 1918, the War Department resembled a sound and respectable organization, organized functionally into four main divisions; Operations, War Plans, Intelligence, and Logistics. There was, in addition, added the Office of the Chief of Staff to serve as the overall coordinator of the four divisions.<sup>I2</sup>

The period between the close of World War I and 1939 saw the lessons learned incorporated into the National Defense Act. From 1939 onward many changes in organization resulted primarily necessitated by the nature of the global warfare aspects of the terrifying war to come.

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II. Ibid., p. 276.

I2. Hittle, Op. cit., pp. 261-262.

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## CHAPTER III

### NAVAL STAFF CONCEPTS

Chapter II discussed briefly the development of the military staff concept. Of necessity, the emphasis was placed on the United States Army staff system. It can be reasonably concluded, that this system with its historical heritage, has been battle tested in two major wars, as demonstrated in the crucible of global and total war, and that it is a practical and efficient instrumentality. In the system, the terms as used; that of staff, staff systems, and the general staff system are described as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Staff. In the military sense, the staff of a unit consists of the officers who assist the commander in the exercise of command. Prefixing the word "general" to staff means that it assists him in commanding his organization.

Special Staff. A group of technical officers operating as the commander's executive staff and representing the functions which the commander's brain is supposed to encompass. It integrates the planning, programs, and the actions so that the functions are coordinated to produce reasonable and timely plans for the commander to order his units to execute. In addition they are advisors to the general staff on technical matters.

Agents of Command. The staff are agents of command, who in addition to formulating plans, gathering information, and transmitting orders, function as supervisory agents of the commander. They have vested in themselves such delegated authority of the commander as he sees fit to give them.

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<sup>1</sup> I. Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, (Washington, D. C., 1948).

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Agents of Command. The staff are agents of command, and in addition to formulating plans, gathering information, and transmitting orders, function as advisory agents of the commander. They have vested in themselves such delegated authority of the commander as he sees fit to give them.



Chief of Staff. Functions to coordinate the efforts of the members of the staff so that details are smoothly dovetailed.

Staff System. A system for the selection of staff officers.

General Staff System. Such a system is employed by most of the major armies of the world. There are four requirements before it can be said that a service has a general staff system.<sup>2</sup> They are:

(A) Staff Corps. First there must be a General Staff Corps. Normally it is a closed service. The officers from the time of their entrance spend the majority of their careers in this duty.

(B) Staff Schooling. Secondly there must be a continuous and progressive system of staff education in functions of staff work in own and higher units.

(C) Staff Doctrine. Third there must be in existence a set of staff doctrines in writing, and approved by higher authority, which prescribes the functions to be performed by the member of the staff, and the manner of execution.

(D) Similarity of Staffs. Fourth, the staff organization is essentially the same in all units, from the highest to the lowest units subjected to staff organization.

In direct contrast to the general staff concept of the Army, no Navy has ever employed a general staff system. This fact has considerable significance when it is compared with the fact that almost all armies have developed such a system. It is based upon the differing needs of armies and navies. Ponderous national armies need a general staff system, at

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2. S. R. Shaw, Col., USMC, A General Staff System for the Navy, Volume 77 Number 8, (US Naval Institute Proceedings, NY, August 1951), pp. 821-822.

Chief of Staff. Functions to coordinate the efforts of the various  
of one staff to lead others in carrying out their duties.

Staff System. A system for the selection of staff officers.  
General Staff System. When a system is organized by one of the  
major states of the world. There are four requirements before it can  
with that a service has a general staff system. They are:

(A) Staff Corps. There must be a General Staff Corps.  
Formally it is a closed service. The officers from the line of  
their entrance spend the majority of their careers in this duty.  
(B) Staff Education. Generally there must be a continuous and  
progressive system of staff education in functions of staff work  
in one and the same unit.

(C) Staff Position. Third there must be an exclusive set of  
staff functions in which, and approved by higher authority, which  
services the function to be performed by the member of the staff  
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has ever evolved a general staff system. This fact has considerable  
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developed such a system. It is based upon the different needs of land  
and naval. However, national navies need a general staff system, as



least for the operational forces to engage in combat, naval forces do not.<sup>3</sup>

In theory, the command of a naval force is exercised by one man. In practice, the actual orders issued to govern the administration of a Fleet may frequently not emanate from the mind of the commander at all, but may simply reflect his policies, or evolve from instructions approved by him.

A staff organization afloat aims at accommodating itself to its own existing departmental shore stations and fleet administrations, while preserving within itself the fundamental requirements of its command, the ideas, policies, and the intentions of the commander it serves, of supplying him with the information that is essential to the discharge of its high functions.<sup>4</sup> In this manner, the commander is afforded the means by which he can impose his will promptly, understandingly, and unquestionably upon his subordinates.

Naval theorists suggest that it would be an error, under existing popular conditions, to form an ideal organization for a supreme general staff for the Navy, except as an academic diversion. Rather the formulation of detached staffs afloat conform to the restriction imposed by the unique aspects of sea warfare.<sup>5</sup>

It is generally felt that the ultimate objective of a naval commander is the defeat of the enemy in battle. To accomplish this, he must have a weapon, ability to use the weapon, and plans for the weapons use.

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3. Ibid., p. 283.

4. C. S. Freeman, Capt. USN, The Exercise of Command Afloat, Volume 331, (U S Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1930) pp. 779-791.

5. Ibid., p. 785.

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A staff organization almost aims at accommodating itself to the existing departmental above standards and lines of administration, while preserving within it the fundamental requirements of its own nature, ideas, policies, and the intentions of the commander. It serves, of course, the commander with the information that is essential to the discharge of his high functions. In this manner, the commander is afforded the means by which he can impose his will promptly, wisely, and judiciously upon his subordinates.

Naval theorists suggest that it would be an error, under existing popular conditions, to form an ideal organization for a system of staff for the Navy, except as an academic diversion. Rather, the formation of detached staffs almost conforms to the restriction imposed by the unique aspects of sea warfare.

It is generally felt that the ultimate objective of a naval commander is the defeat of the enemy in battle. To accomplish this, he must have a weapon, ability to use the weapon, and plans for the weapon.



In Naval warfare his weapon is the fleet and the personnel who man the ships. His ability to use the weapon depends not alone on himself, but upon those who are to him as are the brain impulses motivating the warrior -- his staff. His plan for using the weapon must be based on a knowledge of his opponent and his opponent's weapons. In high commands the knowledge required of commanders is actually beyond any one man's capabilities and capacities. Here we find the root of the need for effective staff operations.

Evolving as they did from their modest beginnings in the Navy, (simply a Flag Lieutenant and Flag Secretary), in which the commander was able to personally perform all the functions of command, staffs have grown gradually to such proportions that they continually warrant thorough examination and analysis. There has been from time to time agitation in attempts to foster the army general staff system to naval staffs as previously indicated. It is generally felt that such is doomed to failure as long as the navy is without a supreme general staff, nor is it probable that even with such a supreme staff, the organization of naval staffs afloat would follow along army lines. In land warfare, in its purely objective and material aspects, there is no real counterpart to the fleet. The sharp differentiations made in the army between staff duties and what are classed as technical and administrative staff duties, are not at all in harmony with present naval organizations, nor with commonly accepted naval concepts of organization. Insofar as possible the fleet must be fit for fighting at all times. The commander must have at hand at all times the agency for keeping him in intimate touch with all the phases of his exercise of command. In other words maintenance in any concept of naval organization is primary and elemental. As expressed earlier, it is

In Naval warfare his weapon is the fleet and the personnel who man the ships. His ability to use the weapon depends not alone on himself, but upon those who are to him as the brain impulses activating the motor — his staff. His plan for using the weapon must be based on knowledge of his opponent and his opponent's weapon. In high command the knowledge required of command is actually gained only one way — capabilities and capacities. Here we find the root of the need for effective staff operations. Involving as they are their most significant in the Navy, (simply a Fleet, Squadron and Flag Secretary), in which the commander was able to personally perform all the functions of command, staff has grown gradually to such proportions that they continually warrant the examination and analysis. There has been from time to time attempts to foster the army general staff system to naval staffs as previously indicated. It is generally felt that such is doomed to failure as long as the navy is without a superior general staff, not to mention that even with such a superior staff, the organization of naval staffs must follow along army lines. In land warfare, in the army, objective and material aspects, there is no real comparison to the navy. The sharp differentiations made in the army between staff duties and are classified as technical and administrative staff duties, are not so in the navy with present naval organization, nor with generally accepted naval concepts of organization. Insofar as possible the fleet must be fit for fighting at all times. The commander must have at hand at all times the agency for keeping his in intimate touch with all the phases of his exercise of command. In other words, retention in any concept of naval organization is primary and elemental. As expressed earlier, it



the function of making and keeping the weapon ready for use ----- the foundation function. With the essential aid of information, appropriate plans can be drawn to conduct operations which through communications culminates in action, the reaction of which is reflected in the secretariat.

Actually, sound organization is essential to effective staff functioning. The Navy unlike the other services, does not have a definite or dogmatic organizational plan which it adopts. It is felt that this is a good thing as it permits the commander to exercise his own ideas of organizational techniques, and to mold his staff closely to the peculiar requirements of his command. In view of this organizational freedom, it could be expected that wide variations in naval staff structures occur, but such is not the case, and one finds various echelons of command conforming to fairly standard patterns. This is due to three things: First, most naval commanders, from practical experience, have in common, the appreciation of the practical application of the basic principles of organization. Secondly, the actual functions of command are comparable in similar organizations. And thirdly, patterns of staffs tend to be influenced by initial allowances predetermined by the Navy Department.<sup>6</sup> A commander normally has a choice as to individuals, but the numbers ordered to him are based on known requirements and availability of personnel.

Thus with other factors being equal, one can see why similar staff commands adopt structures that lend towards standardization.

Of passing interest, although not particularly pertinent, the Navy

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6. F. A. Dingfelder, Capt. U.S.N. "Naval Staff Organization and Functioning" Naval War College Information Service for Officers (January 1952) p. 25.

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
Department can be described as operating under what can be described as a parallel type of organizational structure as opposed to the Army General Staff system. This is shown in Figure 1. Here is found the Chief of Naval operations under the Secretary of the Navy heading up the operating forces (field forces) of the naval establishment, one of the parallel branches. Another parallel branch is the business and administration establishment of the Navy, headed up directly by the Secretary's civilian assistants. In this branch are the bureaus and the offices of the Navy Department. Between these two branches there is provided a considerable amount of cross connection among the various bureaus and offices, and the policy level of the Chief of Naval Operations. It should be noted that this parallel type of organization has been in existence for over a century and a half. To use this as a criteria alone would be foolhardy, but it does indicate the durability of its features. There have been various changes and additions over the years to provide for the technical progressions in naval warfare, and for the changes in the size and scope of operations. It is most interesting to note that the basic structure, the framework has remained the same.

An examination of any organization must take into account the objective or end product. In the Navy, this objective is to provide an effective combatant fighting force. The experiences of World War II and the Korean Incident, the equipment and the tactics of the fast carrier task forces, (superior to any competitors, allied or enemy), indicate that the organization has produced a most satisfactory product.

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An examination of any organization must take into account the objectives or end product. In the Navy, this objective is to provide an effective constant fighting force. The experience of World War II and the lessons learned, the equipment and the tactics of the last century back to the present (apart from any consideration, which is not the case), indicate that the organization has provided a most satisfactory product.







## FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL STAFF ORGANIZATION

"To prepare the operation is to plan and organize; to see that they are carried out is to command and coordinate; to watch the results is to control".<sup>1</sup>

Although discussed previously, it is necessary to mention the "why" of a staff. Why is a staff necessary? Briefly, the many details inherent to any large organization makes it practically impossible for the top executive or commander himself to become involved with all these details and still perform his primary function of command.

In discussing the need for a functional and coordinated staff service, Mooney and Reiley point out some very broad relationships between the commander and his staff as follows:

Always there are too many things to think about, too many factors to consider, too many problems to solve, too diversified a knowledge required for the solution for the unaided capacity for one leader to compass. Though all decisions must remain with the directing head, it is imperative that these problems should come to him pre-digested, with all the thought and the research that organized staff service can bestow upon them. The staff is an extension of the personality of the executive.<sup>2</sup>

From the above it can be concluded that the staff can provide the means by which the commander multiplies and maintains his mental capacities, energies, skills and his capabilities. Thus, he is able to exercise command of his forces, accurately re-appraise the current situation, and by constant foresight and initiative, formulate sound decisions; issue timely plans and directives; and maintain adequate force and drive to execute his will.

What, in general, are the functions of the commander? An accepted

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1. M. Henri Fayol, cited in Army Service Forces Manual M703-I, Control Manual, (Washington: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, March 20, 1943), p. I.

2. Mooney and Reiley, op. cit., p. 299.



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In discussing the need for a functional and coordinated staff service, Mooney and Bailey point out some very broad relationships between the commander and his staff as follows:

Always there are too many things to think about, too many facts to consider, too many problems to solve, too diversified a knowledge required for the solution for the untold capacity for one leader to command. Though all decisions must remain with the directing command, it is imperative that those problems should come to him pre-ligated with all the thought and the research that organized staff service can bestow upon them. The staff is an extension of the personality of the executive.<sup>2</sup>

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What, in general, are the functions of the commander? An acceptable

1. W. Earl Taylor, cited in Army Service Forces Journal 11(3) Control Manual, (Washington: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1943), p. 1.

2. Mooney and Bailey, op. cit., p. 299.

definition of these functions is:

"To authoritatively and effectively control and direct the forces assigned him in the successful accomplishment of his assigned missions".<sup>3</sup>

An analysis of the functions of the commander shows that they include the functions of his staff, and can be illustrated in algebraic fashion as:

$$A = B + C$$

Where A = Functions of the commander

B = Functions of the staff

C = Incremental functions that the commander alone can perform.<sup>4</sup>

It should be clear from the above, that the functions of the commander (A), equals the functions of the staff (B), plus the incremental functions (C), which the commander himself, alone must perform.

If the commander is not provided with a staff, then he must perform all of the functions and we have A minus C. But when he does have a staff, which is a must in the higher commands, his functions are equal to the functions of his staff plus the incremental functions that he alone must perform. These later incremental functions include the making of the decisions and the bearing of the full responsibility for everything his forces do, or fail to do.

To complete this equation, we find that B, the functions of the staff can be derived from its mission:

The mission of the staff is to assist the commander in the discharge of his command function.

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3. S. S. Miller, Captain, USN., "Naval Staffs", Naval War College Information Service For Officers, (January 1952) p. 4.

4. Ibid., p. 4.



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College Information Services for Officers, (January 1952) p. 11.  
J. E. Miller, Captain, USA, "Naval Staffs", Naval War

A. L. Ford, p. 11.



The staff should perform the following tasks for the commander:

1. Gather and evaluate detailed and accurate information in order to advise the commander on all phases of the existing situation; strategical, tactical, and logistical.
2. Develop policies and prepare plans, schedules, and directives for the commander, based upon the mission and directives from higher authorities.
3. Disseminate information and directives to subordinate commanders, and information and reports to higher authorities; rapidly, accurately, and completely, in the execution of the commander's duties.<sup>5</sup>

In order that the staff can best assist the commander in the exercise of his command, they must have a thorough understanding of the policies of the commander, and be acquainted with the subordinate commanders and their units. Under the basic purposes shown, the duties of a staff may be grouped under the following main functions:

1. Provide information required by the commander to plan and conduct operations.
2. Make continuous studies of the situation for anticipatory planning.
3. Submit recommendations as to policies, plans, and orders to the commander in compliance with the directives or own initiative.
4. Translating the decisions and plans of the commander into orders, and causing them to be disseminated to the command.
5. Exercising such supervision as may be directed to insure the carrying out of the intentions and policies of the commander.<sup>6</sup>

The first function is to "provide information". This all important function provides the basis for Sound Military Decision.<sup>7</sup> This necessary

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5. U.S. Naval War College, Principles of Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. Undated) p. 1.

6. Command and General Staff College, FM 101-5, General Staff Officers Manual, Draft, (Ft. Leavenworth: The College, 1947) pp., 10-11.

7. U.S. Naval War College, Sound Military Decision, (Newport, R. I. 1942) p., 10.

The staff should perform the following tasks for the commander:

1. Gather and evaluate detailed and accurate information in order to advise the commander on all phases of the situation: situation, strategy, tactical, and logistical.
2. Develop policies and prepare plans, estimates, and directives for the commander, based upon the mission and directives from the authorities.
3. Disseminate information and directives to subordinate commanders, and information and reports to higher authorities; report accurately, and completely, in the execution of the commander's orders.

In order that the staff can best assist the commander in the execution of his orders, they must have a thorough understanding of the policies of the commander, and be acquainted with the subordinate commanders and their staffs. Under the basic purpose stated, the duties of a staff may be grouped under the following six functions:

1. Provide information required by the commander to plan and conduct operations.

2. Make continuous studies of the situation for anticipatory planning.

3. Submit recommendations as to policies, plans, and orders to the commander in accordance with the directives or own initiative.

4. Translating the decisions and plans of the commander into orders, and ensuring that they are disseminated to the command.

5. Translating such cooperation as may be directed to the commander out of the information and policies of the commander.

The first function is to "provide information". This is the function which provides the basis for sound military decision. This means:

1. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
2. U.S. Naval War College, Principles of Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
3. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
4. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
5. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
6. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
7. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
8. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
9. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.
10. U.S. Naval War College, Naval Staff Organization (Newport, R. I. United States), p. 1.



information on own and enemy forces, and other tangible and intangible matters must be constantly obtained from every fruitful source; evaluated and analyzed to insure that it is sufficiently detailed and accurate to permit the commander to make sound strategic, tactical, and logistic plans. This information must be disseminated to all friendly commands who need to know, as well as within the staff itself to insure coordinated staff action.

The second function is that of "anticipatory planning". It entails making a continuous study of the situation and preparing plans for possible future contingencies in the fields of strategy, tactics, and logistics.

The third function is making recommendations for the "plans and orders", based upon the mission of the commander, and also on directives received from higher authority.

The fourth function is "translating" the commanders decisions into "directives". This function includes the transmission of such directives accurately, surely, and in timely fashion to the properly designated recipients.

The fifth function is "supervising and evaluating". To the extent authorized by the commander, certain designated members of the staff supervise the execution of the plans and orders, and take such action as is necessary, always in the name of the commander, to insure the commander's intentions are carried out. The evaluating function concerns itself with the results of the planned action, in order to apply lessons learned to future operations, and planning.

There are specific fundamentals of good staff organization. A detailed listing of these principles is listed in Appendix A of this paper, prepared by the Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. They are actually the "inner workings" to allow the staff



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to function properly. These fundamentals are not dogmas or all inclusive. They are merely guides which the commander and his staff thoughtfully consider and use, as appropriate, in organizing and operating their staffs, and their sub-staffs.

These fundamentals, when broken down, actually fall into two types, Static and Dynamic.

The following are the Static fundamentals of staff organization;

- I. Unity of Command
2. Span of Control
3. Homogeneous Assignment
4. Delegation of Authority <sup>8</sup>

These fundamentals are termed "static" because they are fixed, "standing still", and are the framework or matrix in which the staff functions dynamically, as living organism. They are the skeleton which does not become dynamic until fired into action by the dynamic fundamentals described later.

The first of these fundamentals is "unity of command". Napoleon in one of his Maxims stated: "Nothing is more important in war than unity of command".<sup>9</sup> Nearly three quarters of a century later, Von Moltke, famous chief of the Imperial German General Staff said:

"Doctrine is to the soldier what policy is to the statesman. As the basis of doctrine, every leader must be supreme within his command else he cannot accomplish his mission." <sup>10</sup>

This fundamental provides that the ultimate control of all action in

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8. Miller, op. cit., p. 6.

9. Colonel C. H. Lanza, Napoleon and Modern War (His Military Maxims Revised and Annotated) (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), p. 85.

10. Colonel H. LeR. Muller, Techniques of Modern Arms, (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1940), p. 53.



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9. Colonel G. H. Lanza, Napoleon and Modern War (New York: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1913), p. 85.

10. Colonel H. J. Miller, Techniques of Modern Warfare (New York: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1940), p. 2.



any organization must be vested in one individual at any organizational level. One "commander" is located at each controlling level. This is a must for all good staff organizations. Each individual must know his job, and must know "to whom he reports", and who reports to him. In this way unity of staff action can best be assured.

The second fundamental is "span of control". This fundamental defines the optimum number of individuals to be controlled from a central source and the considerations associated therewith. The commander should not control too many individuals nor too few directly. The commander must also consider the space and the time magnitudes which separate him from those subordinate individuals over whom he exercises direct control. Current theory has it that the number of subordinate individuals directly controlled by the commander should not be less than three nor more than seven. This bracket permits the commander to operate at peak efficiency.

Many writers of business literature have attempted to fix uppermost limits upon the number of subordinates which a principle can supervise effectively. The number has generally run from three to six. Other writers have suggested that no rigid upper limit exists, but that any limit over seventeen or eighteen should be in suspect. Gulick and Urwick, however, state:

"In actual practice it is necessary to investigate the relationships of concern to the executive, rather than to depend upon the mere numbers of employees in his division". II

Perrin Stryker, in discussing span of control, reports that Fish and Dale, and others of note, in their investigations of span of control

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II. L. Gulick, and L. Urwick (eds) Papers on the Science of Administration, (Institute of Public Administration, 1937), pp., 181-188.; cited in Newman's Administrative Action, p. 261.

any organization must be viewed in the individual as well as organizational level. One "concept" is focused at each controlling level. This is a must for all good staff organizations. Each individual must know his job, and must know "to whom he reports", and who reports to him. In this way much of staff action can best be secured.

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II. E. Gilmer, and L. E. Gilmer (eds) Principles of the Modern Administration (The Institute of Public Administration, 1931), pp. 144-145 cited in Newman's Administrative Action, p. 261.



in industry have found key executives supervising from eight to twenty-five. I2

The third fundamental is "homogeneous assignment", derived from the Greek "homos"---meaning "same", and "genos"---meaning "race" or "kind". It means as we use it, same assignment. As applied to organizations, this fundamental requires that units or individuals within an organization should be assigned to tasks which are of the same kind or related nature, taking advantage of each individuals training and natural aptitude. Thus, an individual trained in aerology would be assigned to the Operations Department rather than, say the Logistics Department.

The fourth static fundamental is "delegation of authority". Although the responsibility of the commander cannot be delegated, the authority of the commander can be delegated by himself if he so desires.

In this regard, the doctrine promulgated at the Command and General Staff College is as follows:

While the heads of staff sections are often given wide latitude to issue orders and instructions in the implementation of orders and policies of the commander, this authority is always delegated and is exercised in the name of the commander. This delegation must be the subject of constant review and inspection. I3

In a staff, no staff officer, acting in that capacity alone has any authority to command whatsoever. The commander, on the other hand, can and does authorize certain members of his staff to act for him on pre-determined matters and within strict policy limits which he has established. All staff officers thus designated act in the name of the commander,

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I2. Perrin Stryker, "Can Management Be Managed?", Fortune (July 1953), 100-101, 138-144.

I3. Command and Staff College, Advance Sheet IOIO, Principles of Staff Organization--II (Fort Leavenworth: The College, 1947), p. I.



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In a staff, no staff officer, acting in that capacity alone has authority to command whatsoever. The commander, on the other hand, does authorize certain members of his staff to act for him on pre-determined matters and within strict policy limits which he has established. All staff officers must thereafter act in the name of the command.

12. Perrin Stuyvesant, "Can Management Be Managed", Fortune (July 1952), 100-101, 133-134.

13. Command and Staff College, Advanced Course 1946, Introduction of Staff Organization--II (Fort Leavenworth: The College, 1947), p. 1.

and the responsibility for their actions remain with the commander.

Next, let us examine the Dynamic fundamental of staff organizations; they are:

1. Selflessness--Loyalty
2. Honesty
3. Knowledge
4. Judgement
5. Human Relations
6. Cooperation
7. Coordination
8. Collaboration
9. Timing <sup>14</sup>

There is no necessity of going into detail of all of the nine fundamentals listed, as they are covered in any book on leadership. Suffice to say that selflessness of staff officers is an essential part of the dynamic fundamentals of good staff functioning. Every staff officer must submerge his own desires; he must work for the good of the commander, and once a decision is reached, support the commanders decision as if it were his own. The staff officer is completely honest and frank with his commander and associates and he thus avoids misunderstanding which undermines dynamic functioning. A staff officer must, in order to contribute most to the success of his commander, have well founded knowledge and his judgement must be sound, endeavoring at all times to increase his knowledge and improve his judgement. In his human relations he is tactful, forbearing, and friendly; he is willing to accept responsibility when given to him and

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<sup>14</sup>. Miller, op. cit., p. 9.



and the responsibility for their actions rests with the command.

Next, let us examine the Dynamic in terms of staff organization.

They are:

1. Self-reliance--Independence

2. Honesty

3. Initiative

4. Judgment

5. Human Relations

6. Cooperation

7. Coordination

8. Collaboration

9. Training

There is no necessity of going into detail of all of the nine functions listed, as they are covered in my book on leadership. Suffice to say that self-reliance of staff officers is an essential part of the dynamic fundamentals of good staff functioning. Every staff officer estimates his own abilities; he must work for the good of the commander, once a decision is reached, support the commander's decision as if it were his own. The staff officer is completely honest and frank with his superior and associates and he thus avoids misunderstandings which hinder dynamic functioning. A staff officer must, in order to coordinate the success of the commander, have well founded knowledge and his staff must work to the best of their ability at all times to increase his knowledge and improve his judgment. In his human relations he is tactful, courteous and friendly; he is willing to accept responsibility when given the chance.



strives to work in harmony with others. He should endeavor to gain full respect from his fellow staff associates by insuring that his motives in all matters are beyond question. The "Golden Rule" of a good functioning staff include; cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The Chief of Staff is responsible to see that the actions implied by the "three golden C's" are carried out. In addition, the Chief of Staff makes every effort to insure that timing in integrated staff work is carried out and fully accomplished.

The delicate relationship between the Static (S) and the Dynamic (D) fundamentals of staff functions (F) can be compared to a set of delicate scales. When (S) and (D) fundamentals are in balance on the pivot (F); the best coordination is achieved, the organization is sound, it functions smoothly, and the commander is free to most effectively do his job. He is relieved of the details, and can devote his attentions to performing his primary tasks.

If however, an over emphasis is placed on either the (S) or the (D) fundamentals, the balance is disturbed, and the organization ceases to function properly, and it will be necessary to counteract the situation with an over emphasis on the opposite set of fundamentals.

None of the above three considerations can be neglected in organizing and operating naval staffs. The staff must perform their designated functions, they must be organized along sound static fundamental lines, and that their functioning is assured by the timely and proper application of the dynamic fundamentals. Over emphasizing either the static or the dynamic fundamentals must be avoided.

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## CHAPTER V

### FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF A NAVAL STAFF

As stated previously, the functions of the commander was "to authoritatively and effectively control and direct the forces assigned him in the successful accomplishment of his assigned tasks".

This general function may be specifically sub-divided into two broad categories:

- I. Operational (leading to the direct accomplishment of the assigned mission)
2. Supporting (permitting success of I above) <sup>I</sup>

The broad categories are further sub-divided into many functions which will be listed in the various illustrations which follow. However, an analysis of the many functions shows that they all can be included under six major headings as follows:

- I. Decision
2. Intelligence
3. Administration
4. Operations and Plans
5. Logistics
6. Communications<sup>2</sup>

Since all functions of command can be segregated into these six major categories, acceptance of this segregation of functions as a basis for divisional organization of a naval staff can be accomplished.

If this is done, a basic organizational plan of a representative staff can be arrived at, and is shown as Figure 2. Here we see the commander and his two aides, the Chief of Staff, and under the Chief of Staff,

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I. F. A. Dingfelder, op. cit., p. 25.

2. Ibid., p. 29.



FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF A NAVAL STAFF

As stated previously, the function of the commander is "to exercise effectively and effectively control and direct the forces assigned him the successful accomplishment of his assigned tasks".

This general function may be specifically sub-divided into two categories:

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I. Operational (relating to the direct accomplishment of the assigned mission)

2. Supporting (pertaining to the success of I above)

The broad categories are further sub-divided into many functions which will be listed in the various divisions which follow. Below an analysis of the main functions shows that they can be included under the major headings as follows:

1. Inspection
2. Intelligence
3. Administration
4. Operations and Plans
5. Logistics
6. Communications

Since all functions of command can be segregated into these six major categories, a comparison of this segregation of functions as a basis for divisional organization of a naval staff can be accomplished.

If this is done, a basic organizational plan of a representative staff can be arrived at, and is shown as Figure 2. Here we see the commander and his two aides, the Chief of Staff, and under the Chief of Staff

1. V. C. Information, op. etc., p. 22.
2. Intelligence, p. 22.




FIGURE 2  
BASIC ORGANIZATION PLAN




FIGURE 5  
BASIC ORGANIZATION PLAN



the five divisions mentioned earlier --- Administration, Intelligence, Operations and Plans, Logistics, and Communications. The primary and important function, that of Decision will of course be performed by the commander himself.

This plan is recognized as the basic structure upon which practically all naval staffs are organized.

It should be noted that the staff divisions are numbered; N-1, N-2, . . . N-5. The first four divisions correspond to the Army "G", and the Air Force "A" divisions. Current policy recommends use of the division numbering system by naval staffs due to the ease of liaison between the services, and intra-staff functioning. Communications is designated as N-5, and if any additional divisions are required, they could assume the number N-6, and so forth. If the staff were organized along joint lines, the divisions would be numbered; J-1, J-2, ..... etc., and for a combined staff; C-1 etc. The title Assistant Chief of Staff is a desirable title adopted in the larger staffs, whereas in the smaller staffs, the title of Administrative Officer, Operations Officer, etc., is more appropriate. With such a basic plan it is an easy matter to assign homogeneously, the various functions which a staff must perform, to appropriate staff divisions. We then have the detailed functional charts, indicative of those shown as figures I through 9.

Figure 3 shows the position of the commander and his two aides. Under the commander there is assigned the functions of Decision, such matters as concern basic policy, commendations, discipline, and moral. The Flag Secretary, in the position shown acts only in the capacity of an aide, but normally has other duties as head of the Administrative Division. In addition to the principle duty as personal aide to the commander, The Flag Lieutenant is normally assigned the duties of Flag Sig-

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


FIGURE 3  
COMMANDER AND AIDES






FIGURE 2  
COMMANDER AND AIDES

nal Officer, and the Division Officer for the enlisted personnel of the Flag allowance. He is also normally responsible for the timely and proper rendition of honors and salutes as well as the conduct of official ceremonies, in addition to supervising the operation of the flag boats and automobiles.

Figure 4 shows the position of the Chief of Staff. In addition to his duties as senior aide and advisor to the commander, he is responsible for coordinating the work of the staff, and for insuring that the policies and the plans of the commander are carried out in accordance with his intentions and will. The Chief of Staff must be a dynamic, intelligent, and industrious officer for this important focal point of any smooth functioning staff.

Figure 5 shows the N-1, Administrative Division, which is normally assigned to the Flag Secretary, and includes official correspondence, files, custody of classified matter, except messages, etc. Also such matters as personnel, legal, dental, public information, etc.

The N-2, Intelligence Division is shown as Figure 6. It collects, evaluates, and disseminates intelligence information. The Operational Intelligence section may include special intelligence; such as tactical information on enemy movements. The Strategic Intelligence section normally includes estimates and studies necessary for future planning of strategic nature. This division is also responsible for technical and counter-intelligence, for censorship, and for the maintenance of the current situation or strategic plot.

Figure 7 shows the Operations and Plans Division. The Operations section of this division is responsible for assigning and coordinating the units assigned to the command, and for directing the operations of



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


FIGURE 4  
CHIEF OF STAFF





FIGURE 4  
CHIEF OF STAFF



**FIGURE 5**  
**ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION**



|                              |                        |
|------------------------------|------------------------|
| ADMINISTRATION               |                        |
| FOR                          |                        |
| ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF     |                        |
| N-1                          |                        |
| (A) FLAG OFFICE              | (D) DENTAL             |
| 1) OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE   | (E) LEGAL              |
| 2) FILES                     | (F) CHAPLAIN           |
| 3) CLASSIFIED MATTER CUSTODY | (G) PUBLIC INFORMATION |
| (B) PERSONNEL                | (H) ATHLETICS          |
| (C) MEDICAL                  |                        |

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION  
FIGURE 2

N-2  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR  
INTELLIGENCE

(A) COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION  
OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

(B) OPERATIONAL

- 1) SPECIAL
- 2) ENEMY
- 3) PHOTO
- 4) SHIPPING

(C) STRATEGIC

1) ESTIMATES & STUDIES

2) AIR & SURF. TARGETS

3) PORTS


(D) TECHNICAL

(E) COUNTER INTELL.

(F) CENSORSHIP

(G) SITUATION PLOT

FIGURE 6  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION



INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
FIGURE 2






FIGURE 7  
OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIVISION




FIGURE 1  
OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIVISION

these units. This normally includes such special operations as may be associated with a particular type of command. They will also be responsible for Training and Aerology, as well as supervising the activities in the flag plot mentioned before. The Plans section includes both current and future planning, and the responsibility for maintaining liaison with other commands.

Figure 8 shows the N-4, Logistics Division, and is assigned such functions as supply, fiscal matters, repairs and maintenance of the fleet units attached to the command, statistics, etc. Here is conducted the important function of financial management. Although not within the scope of this paper, it is personally felt that this represents a fertile area for the adoption of sound comptrollership concepts.

The N-5 Communications Division, shown in Figure 9, provides such rapid communication facilities as will insure positive command communication within the command and with other pertinent commands. This division is also responsible for the registered and classified publications, for the operation of the message center, for communication security and intelligence etc.

This completes the discussion of the detailed functional charts. They are by no means perfect nor fully inclusive. There are many additional functions, and the assignments may vary. However, the charts give a fairly good over-all picture of the functions performed by the staff, and in addition, groups the similar functions within the various divisions to indicate the skills required by those performing them.

In this connection, extensive thought should be given to the determination of the ranks, skills, and the qualifications of the staff members who are required to perform the duties listed, and to the establish-



these units. This normally includes such special operations as may be associated with a particular type of command. They will also be responsible for training and knowledge, as well as supervising the activities in the flag place mentioned before. The flag section includes both present and future planning, and the responsibility for maintaining liaison with other commands.

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The W-5 Communications Division, shown in Figure 9, provides rapid communication facilities as well as some positive command control within the command and with other pertinent commands. This division is also responsible for the registered and classified information for the operation of the message center, for communication security and intelligence etc.

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


FIGURE 8  
LOGISTICS DIVISION



FIGURE 8  
LOGISTICS DIVISION



*N-5*  
*ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF*  
*FOR*  
*COMMUNICATIONS*

- A) RAPID COMMUNICATIONS*
- B) REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS*
- C) COMMUNICATION SECURITY*
- D) ECM*
- E) POSTAL MATTERS*
- F) MESSAGE CENTER*
- G) COMMUNICATION CENTER*

*FIGURE 9*  
*COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION*

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>N-2<br/>ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF<br/>FOR<br/>COMMUNICATIONS</p> | <p>A) RAPID COMMUNICATIONS<br/>B) REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS<br/>C) COMMUNICATION SECURITY<br/>D) ECM<br/>E) POSTAL MATTERS<br/>F) MESSAGE CENTER<br/>G) COMMUNICATION CENTER</p> |
|--|--|

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION  
FIGURE 8

ment of these needs in the staff organization.

Combination position and functional charts should be maintained by every staff. They not only serve as a guide for assigning staff members to the division where maximum benefit can be derived from their technical qualifications and professional backgrounds, but also to serve as a constant reminder of the many functions for which the staff is responsible, and the division of that responsibility within the staff. They also show the position of every staff member and to whom he is responsible.

The organizational plan discussed is of course subject to such changes from time to time commensurate with the commanders desires, and as time and experience indicate need for different arrangements. Nevertheless, the plan described has endured the rigors of time-hardened tests. It embodies all of the principles of good organization which are prerequisites of effective management, and which are so apparent in well managed industries, and sound naval staffs. (See appendix A). The nature and magnitude of the functions in each division will vary with the different echelons and types of commands, but some of all six major functions of command will be found in each structure, thus forming the foundation. A staff should never be created from the viewpoint of assigning functions to individuals, but rather from the viewpoint of assigning individuals to positions in the organization.

Before turning to typical naval staffs, it is felt some mention should be made to Completed Staff Action. This important concept in staff work follows closely the Command and General Staff doctrine:

- I. Make certain that he (the staff officer) understands the specific mission assigned to him, and the limitations, if any, on the scope of his work.



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Combination position and functional charts should be maintained every staff. They not only serve as a guide for assigning staff members to the division where maximum benefit can be derived from their technical qualifications and professional backgrounds, but also to serve as a constant reminder of the many functions for which the staff is responsible and the division of that responsibility within the staff. They also show the position of every staff member and to whom he is responsible.

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Before turning to typical naval staffs, it is felt some mention should be made to completed staff action. This important concept in staff work follows closely the Command and General Staff doctrine:

1. Make certain that he (the staff officer) understands the specific mission assigned to him, and the limitations, if any, on the scope of his work.

2. Consult with other staff sections, interested commanders and agencies to insure that he gains a complete picture of the background and salient factors upon which to formulate conclusions as to the course of action.

3. Consider all practical courses of action and the favorable or unfavorable factors of each of them.

4. Formulate the recommendations. The staff officer must be objective and evaluate both advantages and disadvantages of his recommendations.

5. Work out detailed steps required for implementation, indicating where appropriate, the plan for supervision.

6. Reduce the results of work to succinct and clear statements which present the essential facts, show that all alternative plans have been considered, indicate the views of other agencies concerned have been considered, and give both the advantages and the disadvantages of the recommended action.

Rules of conduct in following the principles of the above procedure: Timeliness, thoroughness, and soundness.<sup>3</sup>

Another version of completed staff action was promulgated and distributed by the Provost Marshall General and appears as Appendix B of this paper. The value of this basic notion is attested to by the fact that since the original publication in 1942, the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal has been asked for reprints by scores of leading firms, universities, business organizations and libraries. The article is well worth detailed study by anyone interested in the concept and modus operandi of completed staff work. A somewhat condensed version promulgated, again, by the Provost Marshall General in wall plaque size appears as Appendix C.

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3. Command and General Staff College, Advance Sheet IOIO, Principles of Staff Organization, op. cit., pp. 3-4.



by the present Journal General in well placed state appears as follows:  
completed staff work. A somewhat confused and uneven presentation, but  
detailed study by experts interested in the present and future of  
staff, business organizations and librarians. The article is well  
journal has been cited for reports by scores of leading firms, univer-  
that since the original publication in 1916, the staff has been  
this paper. The value of this staff action is attested by the fact  
utilized by the present Journal General and appears as follows:  
another version of completed staff action was presented and dis-  
conduct in following the principles of the above pre-  
contrast: flexibility, thoroughness, and consistency.  
basis of conduct in following the principles of the above pre-  
tates of the recommended action.  
have been omitted, and give both the advantages and the disad-  
have been considered, indicate the views of other agencies which  
which present the essential facts, show that all alternative plans  
Reduce the results of work to minimum and clear statement  
cases where appropriate, the plan for organization.  
Work out detailed steps required for implementation, indi-  
objective and evaluate both advantages and disadvantages of his  
or unfavorable factors of each of them.  
3. Consider all practical courses of action and the interrel-  
as to the course of action.  
and agencies to insure that no gains or losses of the  
2. Consider when other staff sections, interested committees



## CHAPTER VI

### TYPICAL U. S. NAVAL STAFFS

Having explored the relationships of the various fundamentals of sound organization as prerequisites to effective staff functioning, an analysis of typical naval staffs can now be attempted, and in addition, some comparisons to Army and Air Force type staffs.

The Navy, unlike the other services, does not have a definite or dogmatic organization plan for universal use. The theory is that this permits a commander to exploit his own ideas of organizational techniques, and to fit his staff more closely to the peculiar requirements of his command. In view of this organizational freedom, a wide variation may be expected in structures of naval staffs, but such is not the case, and it is found that staffs at various echelons of command conform to fairly standard patterns. It is felt that this is due to three reasons:

1. Most naval commanders have a common appreciation of the practical application of the basic principles of organization.
2. The functions of command are comparable in similar organizations.
3. The organizational pattern of naval staffs will tend to be influenced by the fact that their initial personnel allowance is generally predetermined by the Navy Department.<sup>I</sup>

A commander may have a choice as to the individuals assigned, but the number is normally based upon known requirements of similar commands, and on the availability of personnel. These factors explain the tendency towards standardization with the "built in" important requirement of flexibility of the staff structure.

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I. Dingfelder, op. cit., p. 26.

Having explored the relationships of the various fundamentals of sound organization as prerequisites to effective staff functioning, analysis of typical naval staffs can now be attempted, and in addition some comparisons to Army and Air Force type staffs.

The Navy, unlike the other services, does not have a definite doctrinal organization plan for universal use. The theory is that this permits a commander to adapt his own ideas of organizational technique and to fit his staff more closely to the peculiar requirements of his command. In view of this organizational freedom, a wide variation is expected in structures of naval staffs, but such is not the case, and it is found that staffs at various echelons of command conform to fairly standard patterns. It is felt that this is due to three reasons:

1. Most naval commanders have a common appreciation of the practical application of the basic principles of organization.
2. The functions of command are comparable in similar organizations.
3. The organizational pattern of naval staffs will tend to be influenced by the fact that their initial personal influence is generally preponderant by the Navy Department.

A commander may have a choice as to the individuals assigned, but the number is normally based upon known requirements of similar commands and on the availability of personnel. These factors explain the tendency towards standardization with the "built in" important requirement of flexibility of the staff structure.



Each staff is organized in accordance with the major tasks and missions of the command in mind. Generally speaking, it can be said that there emerges a fairly standard rough pattern for both Operational (seagoing), and for Administrative (oft times shorebased) staffs. The Operational, particularly in times of war, find it impractical to perform many of their normal administrative functions in the personnel and logistic fields due to security restrictions. Moreover, the housekeeping requirements aboard ship restrict the physical size of the staff. In operations, the shift of emphasis from one area to another, perhaps thousands of miles apart, make it mandatory that staffs be organized to handle varied and complex problems on the spot. Operational staffs must therefore contain few men with many, many talents. The administrative details are handled, in large part, by the ships which house the staff. These ships, of course, carry their own specialists and gear, however, they too must be supplied with personnel and logistics support. These latter administrative requirements are met by rear echelon staffs whose mission is to perform the essential supporting functions. Commander Service Force Pacific is an example of an administrative staff, whereas Commander XX Fleet is an example of a seagoing operational staff. Discussion and illustrations of these staffs will follow.

But first, let us examine a typical U. S. Navy ship organization. Figure 10 shows a typical standard ship organization. In this case, the ship has the greater emphasis placed on its offensive power (gunnery). The Gunnery Officer is therefore designated as a department head rather than deck officer.

It should be noted that Administration is handled at the Executive Officers level. Intelligence falls under both the Operations Officer and



Each staff is organized in accordance with the major tasks and the nature of the command to which. Generally speaking, it can be said that there emerges a fairly standard rough pattern for both Operational (both) and for Administrative (off times shared) staffs. The Operational staff, particularly in times of war, find it impractical to perform many of their normal administrative functions in the personnel and for the fields due to security restrictions. Moreover, the increasing complexity aboard ship restricts the physical size of the staff. In operation, the shift of emphasis from one area to another, between branches of staff apart, tends to complicate that staff be organized to handle varied and complex problems on the spot. Operational staffs and their form contain few men with many, many talents. The administrative staffs are handled, in large part, by the ships which house the staff. These ships, of course, carry their own specialists and gear, however, they must be supplied with personnel and logistic support. These latter administrative requirements are met by rear echelon staffs whose duty is to perform the essential supporting functions. Commander Service Force Pacific is an example of an administrative staff, whereas Commander IX Fleet is an example of a supporting operational staff. Discussion of illustrations of these staffs will follow.

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



FIGURE 10

STANDARD SHIP ORGANIZATION





the Navigator, who in turn supply the Captain with the intelligence information he needs to know. The operational and planning functions are of course the responsibility of the Operations Officer. From the point of view of logistics, there is a tie-in; all falling under the Executive Officer, the participating departments are; Supply, Medical, Dental, Engineering, Gunnery, and Operations. These department heads are therefore all tied in under the general classification of logistics, and are agents of the Executive Officer who sees that their logistical requirements are coordinated with the Supply Officer. Last, but not least, is Communications, which provide the means by which the Commander exercises his command; in this case we see that this function falls under the jurisdiction of the Operations Officer.

Figure II shows the structure of Commander Service Pacific staff, the typical administrative staff that was touched upon lightly in the previous discussion. This organization, which at first glance appears to violate the important static fundamental of "span of control", actually does not, due to the dotted line for the six left hand brackets. These dotted lines are used to indicate that these staff officers have separate and additional duties as agents of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, a higher command. Due to these dual duties, an important liaison is affected between Commander Services Forces and the Fleet Commander.

Actually, the volume of traffic is low between the Chief of Staff and certain of these divisions. Thus, the Commander, through his Chief of Staff can afford to have more than seven people reporting to him for direct control, although the numbers continually controlled are considerably lower than the chart indicates. Of course if the commander possesses all the dynamic traits that are necessary in order to be capable of full con-

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



FIGURE 11  
COMMANDERSERVICE FORCE PACIFIC FLEET



# COMMANDER FORCE BACIC FEE

## FIGURE 11



trol, as is frequently the case, the static fundamentals can be violated. Here is again demonstrated that the static fundamentals are not dogmas nor all inclusive, and are violated in special and unique circumstances.

Figure I2 shows the structure of the staff of Commander XX Fleet, a hypothetical typical operating staff as discussed before. Here is found the more usual tie-in across the board with no further comment or explanations thought necessary.

An analysis of the sister services will now be attempted. Figure I3 shows a typical Army staff. Here we can see the character of Army staffs which Navy staffs do not always have. Up at the level of the commander is found his personal staff, his aides and others. Others frequently include; Inspector General, Public Relations, etc. The Chief of Staff directly commands the general staff, which as stated previously, is the segment that concerns itself with the general overall picture. In the Air Force, as will be seen, this level is called the coordinating staff. The general or coordinating staff is shown as G-I through G-4 in the boxes; Administration, Intelligence, Operations, and Material. Down below the general staff is found the Special Staff, comprised of officers who are specialists in their own fields; the Medical, Transport, Artillery, Signal, etc. In the Army staff organization, the Special Staff Section Heads report directly to the Commander and not to the Chief of Staff. In some staff organizations, special staff officers also have dual roles, in that they directly command the technical troops assigned to the command. It should be noted that a difference is evident in the Army and Navy concepts in respect to communications (Signal) divisions. In the Navy, the communication function is at, what the army calls the general staff level, whereas in the Army it is at the special staff level.



troop, as is frequently the case, the tactical fundamentals can be violated. There is again demonstrated that the tactical fundamentals are not dogmatic nor all inclusive, and are violated in special and unique circumstances. Figure 12 shows the structure of the staff of Commander in Chief, Army, and is a hypothetical typical operating staff as discussed before. There is no more usual line across the board with no further command or control relations through necessary.

In analysis of the staff services all may be interpreted. Figure 13 shows a typical Army staff. Here we have the character of Army staff which Navy staffs do not always have. As at the level of the command is found his personal staff, his aides and others. Others frequently include: Inspector General, Public Relations, etc. The Chief of Staff directly commands the general staff, which as stated previously, is a general staff command itself with the general staff picture. In the Air Force, as will be seen, this level is called the coordination staff. The general or coordinating staff is shown as G-1 through G-5 in the Administration, Intelligence, Operations, and Material. Down below the general staff is found the special staff, composed of officers who are specialists in their own fields; the Medical, Transport, Artillery, etc. In the Army staff organization, the Special Staff Section heads reports directly to the Commander and not to the Chief of Staff. Some staff organizations, special staff officers also have dual roles that they directly command the technical troops assigned to the command. It should be noted that a difference is evident in the Army and Navy, copies in respect to communications (Signal) divisions. In the Navy, communication function is at, what the Army calls the General Staff, whereas in the Army it is at the special staff level.







FIGURE 12  
COMMANDER XX FLEET

# COMMANDER XX FEET YICORE IS






FIGURE 13  
TYPICAL ARMY STAFF








FIGURE 13

Most Army staffs are generally organized along the same patterns. This characteristic is due mostly to the relatively fixed requirements for staff assistance to the commander in each organic element of the Army. The Battalion, Regiment, Division, Corps and Army, are of such organic similarity that standard staffs for the commanders at their respective levels are natural. In addition, this method facilitates academic instruction in the preparation of staff officers for staff duties, and permits the shifting of these officers readily from staff to staff as basically qualified staff officers.

Figure 14 shows the structure of a typical Air Force Staff. Here again is seen the personal staff as utilized in the Army system. At the level of the Army general staff is found the Coordinating Staff, whose groups consists of A-I through A-4, and permits the inclusion of others as required. Again below is found the special staff group, communications being one of this group. At times the Air Force includes communications under operations. The Air Force organization resembles a more flexible system in its contour and pattern than does the Army due, apparently, to its similarity to the Navy's requirements for moulding its own task forces for particular situations.

In summary then, we find that no Naval staffs are identical. The reason for this is that the missions and special circumstances, and the organizational concepts of the Commander, are seldom the same. Naval staffs, as pointed out, due to space, time, and operational considerations, to say nothing of the variability of missions and forces require flexibility. The Air Force has more or less the same flexibility in their staff concepts of organization, whereas the Army has a somewhat more rigid staff organizational pattern.



Most Army staffs are generally organized along the same pattern. This characteristic is due mostly to the relatively fixed requirements for staff assistance to the commander in each of the elements of the Army. The Battalion, Regiment, Division, Corps and Army, each of which organic similarity that standard staffs for the commanders at their respective levels are natural. In addition, this method facilitates command instruction in the preparation of staff officers for staff duties and permits the shifting of these officers readily from staff to staff basically drafted staff officers.

Figure II shows the structure of a typical Air Force staff. Here again is seen the personal staff as utilized in the Army system. At level of the Air Force general staff is found the coordinating staff, whose groups consists of A-1 through A-11, and permits the inclusion of other as required. Again below is found the special staff, groups, being one of this group. At times the Air Force includes considerations under operations. The Air Force organization resembles a more flexible system in its contour and pattern than does the Army one, especially its similarity to the Navy's requirements for modeling its own task forces for particular situations.

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


FIGURE 14  
TYPICAL AIR FORCE STAFF



## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS

The command and staff structure of the United States Navy is an adequate and efficient instrumentality for the management of vast complexes and aggregates such as modern fleets and shore establishments.

The system provides for an organized division of labor which extends the individual capacities of the Commander, without violating the principle of "unity of command".

The naval staff structure which has emerged through centuries of military staff evolution represents uniqueness in organizational patterns.

The Navy's staff usage appears to exploit all well established principles of management and organization, and achieves a high degree of efficiency in consideration of the problems that lie within the area, and the scope of application and sheer magnitude.

Naval staffs are designed to meet the requirements of various operational situations. Unlike the other services, the Navy does not have a definite or dogmatic organizational plan for universal adoption. This allows the Commander to exploit his own ideas of organizational techniques, and to fit his staff more closely to the peculiar requirements of his command.

This organizational freedom has not produced a wide variation in representative naval staffs, rather a fairly standard pattern has emerged. This in effect reconciles the apparent paradox of flexibility versus standardization.

The high degree of success and efficiency achieved in World War II and the Korean Incident attest to the over-all soundness of naval staff concepts.



The command and staff structures of the United States Navy is an elaborate and efficient instrumentality for the management of vast complexes and aggregates such as modern fleets and shore establishments. The system provides for an organized division of labor which exploits the individual capacities of the Commander, without violating the principle of "unity of command".

The naval staff structure which has emerged through centuries of military staff evolution represents wisdom in organizational patterns. The Navy's staff made appears to exploit all well established principles of management and organization, and achieves a high degree of efficiency in consideration of the problems that lie within the area, the scope of application and their requirements.

Naval staffs are designed to meet the requirements of various operational situations. Unlike the other services, the Navy does not have definite or definite organizational plan for universal adoption. This allows the Commander to exploit his own ideas of organizational techniques, and to fit his staff more closely to the peculiar requirements of his command.

This organizational freedom has not produced a wide variation in representative staffs, rather a fairly standard pattern has emerged. This in effect reduces the apparent picture of flexibility versus standardization.

The high degree of success and efficiency achieved in World War I and the Korean incident attest to the over-all competence of naval staff concepts.

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## APPENDIX A

### TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION<sup>I</sup>

- I. Operation and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility.
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates.
3. Any doubt that outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information.
4. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised.
5. The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision.
6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition.
7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action are of the essence.
8. The coordination and the proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials.
9. The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal; there should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt.
10. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials.
- II. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness.
- I2. There is great danger in careless paraphrasing of information received, and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning and significance of the original.

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I. These principles of organization were prepared by the Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. Reprinted in the Naval War College publication Principles of Naval Staff Organization. pp. 29-30.



## PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION I

1. Operation and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility.
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take responsibility for results in the absence of subordinates.
3. Any doubt that subordinates should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information.
4. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official under his control is properly executed.
5. The implementation of official orders must be followed with close supervision.
6. The maintenance of discipline is responsibility must be maintained through repetition.
7. Competency and productivity are one of the prime factors and effective action is of the essence.
8. The coordination and the proper evaluation of intelligence in the of stress must be maintained by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials.
9. The unsupervised or unreported actions of officials is illegal; there should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt.
10. There is no substitute for instruction and close supervision on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials.
11. Communications must be characterized by clarity, brevity, and directness, and should be organized by clarity, brevity, and directness.
12. There is great danger in careless presentation of information received, and every effort should be made to insure that the information is stated in the true meaning and significance of the original.

1. These principles of organization were prepared by the Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Reprinted in the Navy War College publication Principles of Naval Staff Organization, pp. 27-30.



13. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations.
14. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization.
15. There is a great danger of being blinded by the self evident.
16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of information.
17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility.
18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality.
19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction.
20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization.
21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liason, or confused therewith, where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies.
22. No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task.
23. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed.
24. The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility and authority.
25. In a well balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority.

13. Procedures must be meticulously flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations.
14. Restoration of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization.
15. There is a great danger of being blinded by the self evident.
16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of information.
17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility.
18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for an emergency.
19. Officials, in a personal sense, should never compromise an official instruction.
20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization.
21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in the of liaison, or related therewith, where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies.
22. No organizations should be permitted as excuses for failure to perform a fundamental task.
23. Supervisors must at all times keep their subordinates apprised of their work, conversely, subordinates should keep their supervisors informed.
24. The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility and authority.
25. In a well balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority.



## APPENDIX B

### COMPLETED STAFF WORK<sup>I</sup>

1. The doctrine of "completed staff work" is a doctrine of this office.

2. "Completed Staff Work" is the study of a problem, and presentation of a solution, by a staff officer, in such a form that all that remains to be done on the part of the head of the staff division, or the commander, is to indicate his approval, or disapproval of the completed action. The words "completed action" are emphasized because the more difficult the problem is, the more the tendency is to present the problem to the chief in piecemeal fashion. It is your duty as a staff officer to work out the details. You should not consult your chief in the determination of those details, no matter how perplexing they may be. You may and should consult other staff officers. The product, whether it involves the pronouncement of a new policy or effects an established one, should, when presented to the chief for approval or disapproval, will be worked out in the finished form.

3. The impulse which often comes to the inexperienced staff officer to ask the chief what to do recurs more often when the problem is difficult. It is accompanied by a feeling of mental frustration. It is so easy to ask the chief what to do, and it appears so easy for him to answer. Resist that impulse. You will succumb to it only if you do not know your job. It is your job to advise the chief what to do, not to ask him what you ought to do. He needs answers, not questions. Your job is to study, write, restudy, and rewrite until you have evolved a single proposed action--the best one of all you have considered. Your chief merely approves or disapproves.

4. Do not worry your chief with long explanations and memoranda. Writing a memorandum to your chief does not constitute completed staff work, but writing a memorandum for your chief to send to someone else does. Your views should be placed before him in finished form so that he can make them his views simply by signing his name. In most instances completed staff work results in a single document prepared for the signature of the chief, without accompanying comment. If the proper result is reached, the chief will usually recognize it at once. If he wants comment or explanation, he will ask for it.

5. The theory of completed staff work does not preclude a "rough draft" but the rough draft must not be a "half baked" idea. It must be complete in every respect except that it lacks the requisite number of copies and needs to be neat. But a rough draft must not be used as an excuse for shifting to the chief the burden of formulating the action.

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I. Promulgated by the Provost Marshall General for the direction and guidance of the officers in his office and his service school. First printed in the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal in the issue of January 24, 1942. Reprint of the article contained in the Journal, November 29, 1952, p. 367.





6. The "completed staff work" theory may result in more work for the staff officer, but it results in more freedom for the chief. This is as it should be. Further it accomplishes two things:

(a) The chief is protected from "half-baked" ideas, voluminous memoranda, and immature oral presentations.

(b) The staff officer who has a real idea to sell is enabled to more readily find a market.

7. When you have finished your "completed staff work" the final test is this:

If you were the chief would you be willing to sign the paper you have prepared, and stake your professional reputation on its being right?

If the answer is in the negative, take it back and work it over, because it is not yet "completed staff work".

FOR THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL:

Archer L. Lerch  
Colonel JAGD  
Deputy Provost Marshall General

The following table shows the results of the  
the first trial, and is similar to the second. This  
is an example of the results of the first trial.

The first trial is shown in the table below. The  
results are similar to the second trial.

The second trial is shown in the table below. The  
results are similar to the first trial.

The third trial is shown in the table below. The  
results are similar to the first and second trials.

The fourth trial is shown in the table below. The  
results are similar to the first, second and third trials.

The fifth trial is shown in the table below. The  
results are similar to the first, second, third and fourth trials.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST TRIAL

TABLE I

RESULTS

THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND TRIAL



## APPENDIX C

### EPITOME OF COMPLETED STAFF WORK<sup>I</sup>

#### Completed Staff Work

Study of a problem and presentation of its solution in such form that only approval or disapproval of the completed action is required.

1. Work out all details completely.
2. Consult other staff officers.
3. Study, write, restudy, rewrite.
4. Present a single, coordinate proposed action. Do not equivocate.
5. Do not present long memoranda or explanations. Correct solutions are usually recognizable.
6. Advise the chief what to do. Do not ask him.

If you were the chief, would you sign the paper you have prepared and thus stake your professional reputation on its being right? If not, take it back and work it over; it is not yet completed staff work.

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I. Text of wall plaques appearing in many staff offices. Apparently a paraphrase of the Completed Staff Concept promulgated by the Provost Marshall General (Appendix B).

# STANDARD OF COMPLETION OF WORK

## Completed Staff Work

Study of a project and presentation of the solution in each form that only approval or disapproval of the completed action is required.

1. Work out all details completely.
2. Complete other staff actions.
3. Review, revise, rework, recheck.
4. Review a single, complete proposed action. Do not elaborate.
5. Do not present long memoranda or explanations. Complete memoranda are usually acceptable.
6. Advise the chief that he has the plan.

If you want the chief, would you also then give you have prepared each case with your professional reputation on the line right? If in case it back and with it over; it is not yet completed staff work.

1. Do not let staff appear in any staff action. It is merely a preparation of the completed staff action. (Appendix II). The lowest possible standard.

